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1Strategic Choice Between Process and Product Innovation
under Diﬀerent Competitive Regimes
Abstract
This paper investigates the strategic choice between introducing a process
or a product innovation in a duopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation,
comparing the outcomes in case of Bertrand and Cournot competition. It
is shown that under both competitive regimes three equilibria in innova-
tion adoption may arise: two symmetric equilibria, where ﬁrms select the
same innovation type, and one asymmetric equilibrium. The competitive
regime has an impact on the features of the asymmetric equilibrium, since
in case of Bertrand competition, the high (low) quality ﬁrm chooses a prod-
uct (process) innovation, while ﬁrms make the opposite choices in case of
Cournot competition. The presence of a leapfrogging eﬀect (only in the
Cournot case) explains these diﬀerent outcomes. Last, we ﬁnd that the
Cournot competitors tend to favor the introduction of a new product in
comparison with the Bertrand competitors.
21 Introduction
In markets where manufacturing goods are produced managers often face a
dilemma: is it better to employ the advances in knowledge and technology to
produce a higher quality good or to ensure a higher rate of return by exploiting
the beneﬁts of lower unit costs? For example, in the aircraft industry quality
is represented by the speed, while a larger size yields lower average operating
costs. In 2002 Boeing and Airbus made diﬀerent choices on these two options.
Airbus decided to produce the world’s biggest airliner, the A380 (555 seats with
the possibility of expanding capacity to 800), Boeing decided instead to go for
speed rather than size, trying to develop its Sonic Cruiser (250 seats, which the
possibility to ﬂy at 98% of the speed of sound). Championing speed rather than
size suggests that Boeing thinks most future growth will come from high quality
demand (i.e. fast and frequent point–to–point ﬂights); Airbus, by contrast, still
sees a healthy market for a relatively low–cost super–jumbo to connect the world’s
biggest international airports.1 The above problem can be classiﬁed as the choice
between introducing a product or a process innovation. The former consists in
the production of new goods, while the latter yields a cost saving beneﬁt in the
production of an existing good. This paper tackles this problem and tries to
explain what factors might be important in a ﬁrm’s decision to direct investment
(e.g. R&D expenditure) towards the introduction of a product innovation or of a
process innovation.
We will show that, under both the competition regimes considered (i.e. Ber-
trand and Cournot), three types of equilibria concerning the innovation game
may arise, two symmetric (both ﬁrms introduce either a process innovation or
a product innovation) and one asymmetric, where the high quality ﬁrm intro-
duces a product innovation and the low quality ﬁrm a process innovation under
Bertrand competition. On the contrary, in case of Cournot competition, the high
quality ﬁrm introduces a process innovation while the low quality ﬁrm adopts
a product innovation. The explanation about the determinant of the prevailing
1The Sonic Cruiser project was a failure for Boeing, which decided to produce the 787
Dreamliner, a compromise between speed performances and cost savings.
1equilibria is based on the diﬀerent incentives that the two ﬁrms have about adopt-
ing a certain type of innovation: for instance, under Bertrand competition the
high quality ﬁrm has higher incentives to introduce a product innovation than
the low quality ﬁrm. Quality leader and follower in the ex–ante situation have
instead the opposite incentives under Cournot competition: in this case we obtain
leapfrogging. Some examples conﬁrm that ﬁrms selling goods with diﬀerent qual-
ities follow diﬀerent market strategies: high price car manufactures are usually
the ﬁrst to introduce new optional (e.g. CD players, satellite navigators, ABS,
etc.), supermarket chains with a good reputation are the ﬁrst to adopt quality
standards, while hard discounts make of price reductions (through costs savings)
their mission. Moreover, sometimes we observe a swap in the quality leadership
between ﬁrms, thanks to the introduction of a new good.
A model where ﬁrms strategically choose between either a process or a prod-
uct innovation can also supply some additional insights about the eﬀects of that
decision on the intensity of competition between the two ﬁrms. Under both the
competitive regimes considered the three above equilibria in innovation adop-
tion have diﬀerent impacts on the post–innovation prices. For instance, under
Bertrand competition the intensity of competition is not relaxed if both ﬁrms
adopt a process innovation, i.e. they end up with lower prices than the status quo
levels. On the contrary, price competition becomes less intense if the high qual-
ity ﬁrm introduces a product innovation and the low quality ﬁrm a costs saving
innovation and if both ﬁrms adopt a new product. Hence, since the adoption
of diﬀerent types of innovation creates an eﬃciency gap between the two ﬁrms,
it follows that costs heterogeneity relaxes price competition, and so it can be
classiﬁed as a supply side eﬀect: ﬁrms strategically choose to have an eﬃciency
gap rather than costs homogeneity because competition becomes less intense.2
Notwithstanding the relevance of this issue there exist almost no attempts to
deal with it, since the literature has usually treated the two kinds of innovation
2These results are obtained in a duopoly model with vertical diﬀerentiation where the market
is uncovered, but they also apply to the covered conﬁguration. The literature (see Choi and
Shin [1992] and Wauthy [1996]) has shown that the choice of the market conﬁguration (covered
or uncovered) is endogenous. A market is covered if all consumers with a positive willingness
to pay for the good buy it, while it is uncovered if some consumers do not purchase the good.
2separately. Bonanno and Haworth [1998] (henceforth BH) has provided, up to
now, the closest contribution to our work. They ﬁnd that the type of competitive
regime in which the ﬁrms ﬁnd themselves (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may explain why
a ﬁrm decides to adopt a product innovation and not a process innovation (and
vice versa). They study this problem in a vertically diﬀerentiated duopoly where
only one ﬁrm can innovate. BH show that if the innovator is the high quality ﬁrm
a tendency to favor product innovation emerges in case of Bertrand competition
and to favor process innovation in presence of Cournot competition.3 On the other
hand, if the innovator is the low quality ﬁrm and whenever the two regimes lead
to diﬀerent adoptions, the Bertrand competitor chooses to introduce a process
innovation, while the Cournot competitor introduces a product innovation.
Few other contributions have weaker links with our work. Rosenkranz [2003]
studies, in a Cournot duopoly model with horizontal diﬀerentiation, how two
competitors will optimally invest into both process and product innovation.4 She
shows that an increase in consumers’ reservation price causes ﬁrms to increase
R&D investments but also to shift them towards product innovation if the rel-
ative eﬃciency of the two types of innovation is kept constant. Lambertini and
Orsini [2000] analyze the incentives to introduce a product innovation or a pro-
cess innovation in a vertical diﬀerentiated monopoly (and so there is no strategic
interaction).5 Weiß [2003] presents a duopoly model with horizontal diﬀerenti-
ation where ﬁrms choose between a process or product innovation. The latter
consists in ﬁxing the proﬁt maximizing variety (while the pre–innovation variety
is not optimal). In her framework the competitors are engaged in a two–stage
competition, i.e. ﬁrst they select the type of innovation and then they compete
3In general if the innovator is the high quality ﬁrm one of three things may happen: (1)
both the Cournot competitor and the Bertrand competitor choose the process innovation; or
(2) both select the product innovation; or (3) they make diﬀerent choices. Under the latter
case the Bertrand (Cournot) competitor choose to introduce a product (process) innovation.
4She develops the idea that usually ﬁrms have a portfolio of R&D projects, some more tar-
geted at process innovations and some at product innovation, so that the optimal mix between
these two types of innovation becomes a key variable in the competitive environment.
5They show that the social planner and the monopolist might adopt diﬀerent type of inno-
vation.
3in price. She shows that all feasible moves in innovation adoption may belong
to the equilibrium path and that the intensity of competition aﬀects the equilib-
rium selection (if competition is intense (modest) ﬁrms choose product (process)
innovation, while if it is intermediate they select asymmetrically).
This paper is an attempt to extend BH’s results by considering that, in an
oligopolistic environment with vertical diﬀerentiation, the choice between a prod-
uct or a process innovation is taken simultaneously by all the ﬁrms in an industry.
We shall think of process innovation as a reduction in the ﬁrm’s production costs,
so that it can be deﬁned as costs saving eﬀect on ﬁrm’s eﬃciency. Product inno-
vation will be interpreted as an improvement in the quality of a ﬁrm’s product,
and we label this as quality eﬀect. We will show that BH’s results, in a frame-
work where both ﬁrms innovate, do not take into account for the possibility of
leapfrogging. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the Cournot competitors tend to favor the
introduction of a new product w.r.t. the Bertrand competitors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, Section
3 analyzes the strategic choice between product and process innovation under
Bertrand competition. The investigation is divided in two subsections: the pre–
innovation equilibrium, where the two ﬁrms’ qualities are determined (Section
3.1) and the solution of the innovation game (Section 3.2). Section 4 studies the
Cournot case, again splitted in the pre–innovation equilibrium (Section 4.1) and
in the innovation equilibrium (Section 4.2). Section 5 presents the main results
of the paper, while their proofs are reported in the Appendix.
2 The model





L (“0” indicates the status quo) sell a vertically diﬀer-
entiated good and may be engaged in Bertrand or in Cournot competition. At
t = 1 ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to adopt a ProCess innovation (PC),
or a ProDuct innovation (PD).6 Hence at time t = 1 ﬁrm i (i = H,L, where L
6We rule out the possibility of choosing both types of innovation. Furthermore, notice that
the decision not to innovate is not considered since it is easy to show that it is always dominated
4stands for “low” quality ﬁrm and H for “high” quality ﬁrm7) chooses Ii, where
Ii =
(
1 if ﬁrm i selects PC
0 if ﬁrm i selects PD
This choice aﬀects ﬁrm i’s costs function if Ii = 1 and instead its market
share if Ii = 0. We consider that quality is a variable cost (Champseaur and
Rochet [1989], Gal–Or [1983] and Mussa and Rosen [1978]) so that ﬁrms have
the following costs function: C(yi,θi) = c
θ2
i
2 yi, where yi is the output of ﬁrm i,
θi its quality and c the constant unit costs of production.8 A process innovation
reduces marginal costs (i.e. it has a costs saving eﬀect) by decreasing c; without
loss of generality we assume that under Ii = 1 production costs become negligible
(i.e. c = 0). If instead ﬁrm i introduces a new product, it beneﬁts from an
increase in its quality from θ0
i to ψθ0
i with ψ > 1 (see BH p. 502). Hence we
label ψ as the quality eﬀect. These two eﬀects are exogenous, since we assume
that the innovator has invested in R&D (e.g. it has built a lab and hired a team
of scientists) and the corresponding costs are sunk.9 Note that before choosing
which type of innovation to adopt ﬁrms have the same costs, and that costs
homogeneity is maintained if they make the same type of adoption; instead in
case of asymmetric adoptions they have diﬀerent costs functions. Moreover, it
follows from our setup that if at t = 1 a ﬁrm has selected a process innovation its
quality remains ﬁxed at the pre–innovation level, i.e. if Ii = 1 → θi = θ0
i at t = 2.
At t = 2, after observing the rival’s innovation choice, under Bertrand (Cournot)
competition ﬁrms choose simultaneously the price pi (quantity yi).
The market demand is speciﬁed as follows: each consumer buys only one
unit of the good, and is characterized by the net utility function U = sθ − p,
where s ∈ [0,1] and p is the price paid for the good. As usual the variable s
by introducing one of the two innovation types.
7The choice of being either the high quality ﬁrm or the low quality ﬁrm (see Herguera and
Lutz [1998]) should be studied in a stage before the choice of innovation. We do not solve this
stage, but we assign a label to each ﬁrm.
8Our results are valid also for a costs function where quality is a ﬁxed cost (Bonanno [1986],




2 , but are based on
a simulation analysis. Results are available upon request.
9Without loss of generality we assume that R&D costs are equal to 0.
5represents the consumer’s willingness to pay (a taste parameter) for the good
(Tirole [1988]), and is uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1]. From the
above and since the consumer with the lowest willingness to pay is located in
0, he/she will never buy the good, unless p ≤ 0. Hence the market is always
“uncovered” and some consumers are always out of the market. The consumer
indiﬀerent between buying the low quality good and not buying at all has a utility
given by sθL −pL = 0, so that s =
pL
θL. The consumer indiﬀerent between buying
the low quality good and the high quality good has a taste parameter equal to
s∗ =
pH−pL
















while under Cournot competition we have
pH = θH(1 − yH) − θLyL (3)
pL = θL(1 − yH − yL) (4)
with yH +yL < 1. Note that in case of product innovation the innovator receives
a “market share premium”. For instance, in case of price competition, if the in-
novator is the high quality ﬁrm, its new quality is ψθ0





L < s∗, i.e. s∗0 → s, thereby increasing its market share. If in-










0 → 0 while s∗0 → 1 and so yL ↑. Moreover, in case of product innovation
we will take into account that, if the unique innovator is the low quality ﬁrm, a






We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium, i.e. a pair of strategies which
forms a Nash equilibrium in each subgame. As usual, we compute the solution
by backward induction, starting from the last stage of the game, i.e. the Bertrand
6(or Cournot) subgame. Firm i’s proﬁt in the Bertrand subgame is the following
(B stands for Bertrand):
πB
i (Ii,Ij) = IiIj [piyi(θ0
i,θ0






























with i 6= j and i,j = H,L. Under Cournot competition, the individual proﬁt
function is (C is for Cournot):
πC
i (Ii,Ij) = IiIj [pi(θ0
i,θ0






























again with i 6= j and i,j = H,L.
3 Innovation adoption under Bertrand competition
In this Section we investigate the strategic choice between product and process
innovation if ﬁrms compete in prices in the ﬁnal market. Since the adoption of a
certain type of innovation depends upon the status quo quality levels (i.e. θ0
H,θ0
L),
it is necessary to compute the equilibrium before the innovation game.
3.1 The pre–innovation equilibrium












































7Firms maximize (7)–(8) by choosing ﬁrst the quality pair (θ∗
H,θ∗
L) and then the
market prices (p∗
H,p∗




















































θL[2(θH − θL) + cθH(θH + 2θL)]
2(4θH − θL)
(12)
Substituting (11)–(12) in (1)–(2) gives:
yH =




θH[2 − c(θH + θL)]
2(4θH − θL)
(14)
Replacing (11)–(12) in (7)–(8) we obtain the proﬁts’ reduced form at the quality
stage, i.e.
πH =




θL(θH − θL)[2 − c(θH + θL)]
2(4θH − θL)
× yL





















2(4θH−θL)2 = 0 (16)
We can now state the equilibrium qualities in the pre–innovation stage and all
the corresponding outcomes for both ﬁrms.
8Proposition 1 In the equilibrium of the Bertrand pre–innovation game, the












Proposition 1 shows that the high quality ﬁrm enjoys a higher proﬁt by selling
to the smaller but “richer” market niche (y0
H < y0
L since y0
H = 0.28, y0
L = 0.34);






3.2 The innovation game
Having solved for the pre–innovation quality levels, we can now compute the
subgame perfect equilibrium of the innovation game under price competition.
3.2.1 Subgames
Starting from the last stage of the game, we have to identify the Nash equilibrium
in four possible subgames, according to the innovation choices made by the two
ﬁrms at t = 1.
Case a: IH = IL = 1





L,10 the two proﬁt functions, from (5) are:
π
B










































10The superscripts indicate the innovation moves at t = 1; {11} means that IH = 1 and
IL = 1.
9In this subgame the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is the same of the pre–
innovation game, while the two ﬁrms have the same unit cost of production in








L = 0, we get















































c , we get the two ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions at t = 1 if they both















L is slightly higher than π0
L) and that ﬁrm H enjoys
a large proﬁt increase in comparison with its pre-innovation proﬁt.
Case b: IH = 0,IL = 1
The high quality ﬁrm has adopted a product innovation, so that θ01
H = ψθ0
H,
while ﬁrm L has chosen a process innovation, i.e. θ01
L = θ0
L. The two proﬁt
functions before choosing prices are:
π
B
















































The degree of vertical diﬀerentiation increases in comparison with that arising in
the pre–innovation game. However ﬁrm L enjoys a cost advantage. By diﬀeren-
10tiating the two proﬁt function w.r.t. prices and then by solving the two FOCs’



























































By substituting for θ0
H and θ0




1.80(ψ − 0.13)2(ψ − 0.77)2






c(8.81ψ3 − 6.43ψ2 + 1.17ψ − 0.06)
(22)
Case c: IH = 1,IL = 0
The two ﬁrms make diﬀerent choices also in this case, since ﬁrm H goes for





L. Hence for ψ increasing, there is the possibility of
leapfrogging: the latter happens when ψθ0
L ≥ θ0




L = 2.05. We
have then to investigate two sub–cases: (1) no leapfrogging, i.e. 1 ≤ ψ < 2.05;
(2) leapfrogging (ψ > 2.05).
Sub–case 1: no leapfrogging
The two proﬁt functions are:
π
B













































11Note that 0 < y01
H < 1, 0 < y01
L < 1 and y01
H +y01
L < 1 for ψ > 1, while p01
H > 0 and p01
L > 0












































































0.05(ψ − 0.45)2(ψ − 1.80)2
c(8.81 − 6.43ψ + 1.17ψ2 − 0.06ψ3)
(24)
At this stage we have to consider an important issue: since in this sub–case we
have always a reduction in the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation (which is equal
to 0 if ψ = 2.05), ﬁrm L may have not the incentive to choose IL = 0 in response
to IH = 1. This is because the reduction in the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation
may reduce its proﬁt, rather than increasing it. The literature has pointed out
(Gabszewicz and Thisse [1979,1980], Shaked and Sutton [1982], BH [1998]) that
ﬁrm L, under Bertrand competition may refrain to increase its quality even if it
can do this at no costs (as in this model). If we evaluate
∂πB10
L
∂ψ < 0 we obtain that
∂πB10
L
∂ψ < 0 if 1.20 < ψ ≤ 1.80, while the derivative is positive for 1.80 < ψ < 2.05.
However under the latter situation y10
L becomes negative and so this solution is
unfeasible. Hence we can say that to respond with IL = 0 to IH = 1 is rational
only when 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.20. If instead 1.20 < ψ < 2.05 the only chance that ﬁrm L
will consider as a reply to IH = 1 is IL = 1.
Sub–case 2: leapfrogging
In this situation ﬁrm L becomes the quality leader. Moreover, the degree








. Hence the structure of the two ﬁrms’ demand function changes,
as it is shown by the following proﬁt functions:
π
B













































































































0.10(ψ − 0.09)2(ψ − 2.16)2
c(1.01ψ3 − 3.13ψ2 + 2.41ψ − 0.55)
(26)
and so the impact of ψ on π0





0.10(ψ − 0.09)(ψ − 0.51)(ψ − 1.96)(ψ − 2.16)(ψ2 − 1.44ψ + 1.95)
c(0.30 − 2.65ψ + 9.25ψ2 − 16.19ψ3 + 14.67ψ4 − 6.34ψ5 + 1.03ψ6)
(27)
Computation shows that the denominator is always positive for ψ ≥ 2.06,




∂ψ < 0 and so the strategy IL = 0 as a response to IH = 1 is unfeasible.
Indeed ﬁrm L will introduce a product innovation when this leads to leapfrogging
only if ψ > 2.16. Hence, to sum up, the strategy pair (IH = 1,IL = 0) is feasible
only for 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.20 and for ψ > 2.16. In the ﬁrst interval no leapfrogging
occurs and ﬁrms’ proﬁts are given by (23)–(24), while in the second one they are
(25)–(26).
Case d: IH = IL = 0




L. Hence the two proﬁt functions are:
π
B


















13Figure 1: Firm H’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IL = 1
π
B





















Again, the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is unchanged in this subgame. Solving

































































14Figure 2: Firm H’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IL = 0
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Having identiﬁed the reduced form of ﬁrm i’s proﬁt under each possible innovation
moves at t = 1, we can now identify the subgame perfect equilibrium. First we
have to compute ﬁrm H’s best reply to IL = 1 and to IL = 0. If ﬁrm L selects
IL = 1, then ﬁrm H’s proﬁts, i.e. (20) and (21), are those shown in Figure 1).
Hence we can write, by solving the inequality πB11
H ≥ πB01
H , the best response




H(IL = 1) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.65
0 otherwise (30)
If instead ﬁrm L chooses IL = 0, we have that ﬁrm H proﬁt is given by, if it
adopts a process innovation, (23) if ψ is small and so no leapfrogging occurs, and
by (25) if ψ is large (and so we have leapfrogging); if instead ﬁrm H chooses a
product innovation as well, its proﬁt is given by (28). Its proﬁt functions are
shown in Figure 2. Clearly, ﬁrm H ﬁnds more proﬁtable to select IH = 1 if
1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.20 (πB10
H does not exist for 1.20 < ψ ≤ 2.16), so that its best reply to
IL = 0 is the following:
I
B
H(IL = 0) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.20
0 otherwise (31)
We move now to analyze ﬁrm L’s best responses in the innovation game. If
ﬁrm H adopts a process innovation, the low quality ﬁrm has the proﬁt functions
displayed in Figure 3. The best reply is clearly the following one (notice that




L (IH = 1) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 2.33
0 otherwise (32)
Figure 3: Firm L’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IH = 1
Last, we need to study ﬁrm L behavior when the high quality ﬁrm chooses
a product innovation. Figure 4 shows that ﬁrm L’s proﬁt is decreasing in ψ if
it adopts a process innovation (πB01
L ) and increasing in ψ if it selects a product
innovation as well (but it remains the quality follower). By comparing (24)–(26)
and (29) we have that πB01
L ≥ πB00
L when ψ ≤ 1.75, i.e. that ﬁrm L’s best reply
to IH = 0 is:
I
B
L (IH = 0) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.75
0 otherwise (33)
Now we can identify the equilibrium in innovation adoption.
Proposition 2 In case of Bertrand competition, the innovation game has the
following equilibria: (i) both ﬁrms adopt a process innovation if quality eﬀect is
relatively small compared to cost reduction eﬀect (i.e. if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.65); (ii) the
quality leader introduces a product innovation while the quality follower adopts a
process innovation if the quality eﬀect is intermediate (i.e. if 1.65 < ψ ≤ 1.75);
(iii) both ﬁrms adopts a product innovation if the quality eﬀect is large (i.e. if ψ >
1.75). Leapfrogging never occurs and the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation either
is unchanged (in the two symmetric equilibria) or increased (in the asymmetric
equilibrium).
16Figure 4: Firm L’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IH = 0
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that only three equilibria can arise in the innovation game
under Bertrand competition: two symmetric equilibria (where both ﬁrms adopt
either a process innovation or a product innovation) and only one asymmetric
equilibrium (where the high quality ﬁrm adopts a product innovation and the
low quality ﬁrm a process innovation). Moreover it highlights that the high
quality ﬁrm is the ﬁrst to adopt a product innovation, and that there exists an
interval where the low quality ﬁrm still ﬁnds proﬁtable to beneﬁt from a unit costs
reduction and not from a product innovation. Note that when the equilibrium is
(I∗
H = 0,I∗
L = 1) the two competitors have costs heterogeneity. By comparing the
status quo (i.e. the pre–innovation equilibrium) and the market outcomes under
each innovation equilibrium we can draw several interesting implications.
First, under the symmetric equilibrium I∗
H = I∗













L . Hence the
competition in R&D gives rise to a decrease in market prices. The latter implies
an increase in the intensity of competition between the two ﬁrms (with a constant
degree of vertical diﬀerentiation). For both ﬁrms the cost savings eﬀect has a
negative strategic eﬀect: the competitor responds to a reduction in ﬁrm i’s costs
by reducing its own price, thereby increasing the intensity of competition. The
high quality ﬁrm beneﬁts from this: its market share rises up as well as its
proﬁts. On the contrary, the low quality ﬁrm suﬀers of a proﬁt loss compared
with the status quo: since both goods have the same quality than in the status
17Figure 5: Firms’ proﬁts under the innovation equilibria—Bertrand competition
quo but are sold at lower prices, more consumers buy the high quality good.12
The price reduction operated by the low quality ﬁrm is not enough to attract
more consumers towards its good.
Second, under the asymmetric equilibrium {I∗
H = 0,I∗
L = 1}, we have that
p01
H increases with ψ, while p01





L. Hence price competition is softer than in the status
quo. Meanwhile, y01
H (y01
L ) increases (decreases) with ψ, and both market share are







L ). Hence both ﬁrms beneﬁt from
the reduction in competition due to asymmetric adoption and costs heterogeneity.
Last, if both ﬁrms adopt a product innovation, we get that in the interval
ψ > 1.75087 both market prices arise with ψ and are higher than the status quo,
as well as the two ﬁrms’ market shares. Moreover, this market share premium is
proﬁtable for both ﬁrms (i.e. πB00
i > πB0
i ). Figure 5 shows the proﬁtability of the
three equilibria for the two ﬁrms.
12Since ﬁrm H adopts a process innovation under this equilibrium, ﬁrm L gets a reduction
in its proﬁts compared with the pre–innovation level. However, its proﬁts would be lower if it
chooses to remain at the status quo: in this case ﬁrm L would have the same pre–innovation
quality and no cost savings, suﬀering from an eﬃciency gap from the high quality ﬁrm. If




2 yL and the solution at t = 2
is yH = 0.62,yL = 0.12, and, above all, πL = 0.003
c < πB11
L . Hence adopting an innovation is
always a dominating strategy.
184 Innovation adoption under Cournot competition
In this Section we analyze the innovation game when ﬁrms compete ´ a la Cournot
in the ﬁnal market. First we need to compute the two pre–innovation quality
levels.
4.1 The pre–innovation equilibrium
Under quantity competition the two ﬁrms’ market demand are (3)–(4), and so
the two ﬁrms’ proﬁts are:
π
C














Firms maximize (34)–(35) w.r.t. (θH,θL) ﬁrst and then w.r.t. (yH,yL). By solving


















L = 0 (37)




































2(4θH−θL)2 = 0 (41)
The following Proposition points out the equilibrium in the pre–innovation
stage.
19Proposition 3 In the equilibrium of the Cournot pre–innovation game, the qual-





c . Hence the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is lower than un-





c , but less than being in the same position under Bertrand.
Proof: See Appendix.
Again the high quality ﬁrm has a lower but more proﬁtable market share than
the low quality ﬁrm (y0
H = 0.22, y0





c ). Moreover, both ﬁrms enjoy higher proﬁts than under Bertrand.
4.2 The innovation game
The two ﬁrms have to decide simultaneously which type of innovation to adopt
when they compete ` a la Cournot and have their qualities set at θ0
H,θ0
L. To identify
the subgame perfect equilibrium we apply the same procedure shown in Section
3.2; hence a less detailed explanation is provided here.
4.2.1 Subgames
Again there are four possible Cournot subgames, according to the innovation
choices made at t = 1. In each subgame the ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions vary according
to (6), after substituting for each possible {IH,IL} pair.
Case a: IH = IL = 1







































∂yL = 0, we obtain these market outcomes






















































Notice that both ﬁrms increase proﬁts in comparison with the pre–innovation
stage, as well as their market share. On the contrary, market prices shrink: again
the process innovation gives rise to a more intense competition.
Case b: IH = 0,IL = 1





































































































1.61(ψ + 1.20(10−10))(ψ − 0.77)2




c(2.95ψ − 0.59)2 (43)
21Case c: IH = 1,IL = 0







L = 1.26. We have to study two subcases.
Sub–case 1: no leapfrogging


















































































































0.19(ψ − 0.59)(ψ2 + 3.28ψ + 2.95)
cψ2(25.73 − 15.31ψ + 3.04ψ2 − 0.20ψ3)
The numerator is always positive, while the denominator is greater than 0 if ψ = 1
and is increasing in ψ when
∂(.)
∂ψ > 0. The latter is equal to 0.60ψ2−6.08ψ+15.31,
and it is greater than 0 if ψ ≤ 3.57 and ψ ≥ 6.57; hence since 1 ≤ ψ < 1.26
the denominator is always positive too. This implies that, diﬀerently from the
Bertrand case, the low quality ﬁrm always beneﬁts from increasing its quality
under no leapfrogging and so the solution IH = 1,IL = 0 is always feasible in this
sub–case.
22Sub–case 2: leapfrogging
If ψ > 1.26 ﬁrm L becomes the high quality ﬁrm. Hence the two ﬁrms swap
their positions in the consumers’ ranking regarding vertical diﬀerentiation, so
that the individual demands are deﬁned as follows: pH = θ0
























































L = 0 we obtain the two equilibrium prices in this























































c(2.34ψ − 0.74)2 (45)





1.88(ψ − 0.92)(ψ2 − 0.02ψ + 0.29)
c(12.85ψ3 − 12.15ψ2 + 3.83ψ − 0.40)
and both the numerator and the denominator are positive for ψ > 1.



























































c(2.34ψ−0.74)2 if ψ > 1.26
(47)
23Case d: IH = IL = 0
If both ﬁrms decide to introduce a product innovation, the proﬁt functions at


















































































































































We are now in a position to compute the equilibrium at t = 1. First we need to
identify each ﬁrm’s best reply by comparing the available proﬁt functions when
the rival is adopting a given strategy. We start from ﬁrm H. If ﬁrm L chooses
IL = 1, the proﬁt functions shown in (42) and (43). Hence we need to solve
πC11
H ≥ πC01
H , which is true for ψ ≤ 1.60. The behavior of the proﬁt functions
24Figure 6: Firm H’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IL = 0 under Cournot
πC11
H and πC01
H as function of ψ is similar to that displayed in Figure 1. Hence
ﬁrm H’s best reply when IL = 1 is the following one:
I
C
H(IL = 1) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.60
0 otherwise (49)
If instead ﬁrm L chooses IL = 0 ﬁrm H’s proﬁt functions are those shown in (46)
and (48). The plot of these functions is reported in Figure 6; it is evident, by
comparing it with Figure 2, the diﬀerence between the Bertrand and the Cournot
case in this situation where leapfrogging may occur. While under Bertrand com-
petition the low quality ﬁrm has no incentives to adopt a product innovation
when the high quality ﬁrm has chosen a process innovation, if ﬁrms are engaged
in Cournot competition the low quality ﬁrm always gains from investing in a
product innovation when the high quality rival has adopted a cost reduction. To
identify the best reply, we need to solve πC10
H ≥ πC00
H for ψ, which is fulﬁlled when
ψ ≤ 1.66. Hence ﬁrm H’s best reply when IL = 0 is:
I
C
H(IL = 0) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.66
0 otherwise (50)
The next step is to compute ﬁrm L’s best reply. If ﬁrm H selects IH = 1
the two proﬁt functions that we need to compare are shown in (42) and (47).
Figure 7 shows the plot of these functions, which is diﬀerent from that displayed
in Figure 3, for the same reason just explained. Notice that πC10
L , diﬀerently from
25Figure 7: Firm L’s proﬁts as function of ψ if IH = 1 under Cournot
the Bertrand case, is always increasing in ψ. We have to study when πC11
L ≥ πC10
L ,
which is true for ψ ≤ 1.54. Hence ﬁrm L’s best reply when IH = 1 is:
I
C
L(IH = 1) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.54
0 otherwise (51)
The last best reply regards ﬁrm L’s behavior when the high quality ﬁrm adopts a
product innovation. To identify it we need to consider the proﬁt functions shown
in (43) and in (48) (the plot of these functions is similar to that shown in Figure
4), and so study when πC01
L ≥ πC00
L . The latter is true when ψ ≤ 1.65. Hence
ﬁrm L’s best reply to IH = 0 is the following one:
I
C
L(IH = 0) =
(
1 if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.65
0 otherwise (52)
We are now in a position to state the equilibrium of the innovation game
under Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In case of Cournot competition, the innovation game has the
following equilibria: (i) both ﬁrms adopt a process innovation if quality eﬀect is
very small compared to cost reduction eﬀect (i.e. if 1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.54); (ii) both
ﬁrms introduce a product innovation if the quality eﬀect is suﬃciently large (i.e.
psi > 1.66). (iii) If the quality eﬀect is intermediate (i.e. 1.54 < ψ ≤ 1.66)
leapfrogging occurs since the pre–innovation high quality ﬁrm chooses a process
innovation while the pre–innovation low quality ﬁrm selects a product innovation
and becomes the quality leader.
26Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 points out that also in case of Cournot competition three equi-
libria may arise in the innovation game, two symmetric equilibria and one asym-
metric equilibrium. However the latter is diﬀerent from that prevailing under
Bertrand, since the high quality ﬁrm selects a process innovation while the low
quality ﬁrm chooses a product innovation. Since this happens for a quality ef-
fect suﬃciently high, it involves leapfrogging. Hence under Cournot the degree of
vertical diﬀerentiation may also decrease in comparison with it ex–ante level.
This diﬀerence in the asymmetric equilibrium between the two regimes is due
to the ﬁrms’ incentives to adopt a certain type of innovation as a best reply to the
rival’s type of innovation. Under Cournot, the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation is
lower than under Bertrand, since ﬁrms already enjoy a less intense competition.
Consequently, the high quality ﬁrm, if the size of the product innovation is not
too high, may prefer to adopt a process innovation if it anticipates that the low
quality ﬁrm goes for a product innovation. The intuition is the following: if ﬁrm
L chooses a product innovation, the high quality ﬁrm is subject to leapfrogging
and loses its leadership. However, the quality gap is not too big and, instead, the
cost advantage granted by a process innovation is large, so that its best reply is
to adopt a process innovation. On the other hand, the low quality ﬁrm responds
to the adoption of a process innovation by the high quality ﬁrm with a product
innovation because, thanks to leapfrogging, it becomes the quality leader. Vice
versa, if it chooses a process innovation as well, the quality gap is as in the ex–ante
equilibrium and so it suﬀers from being the quality follower, and the beneﬁt given
by adopting a process innovation is too small. For this reason, in presence of a
product innovation of intermediate size, the high quality ﬁrm chooses a process
innovation, and the low quality ﬁrm a product one.
On the contrary, under Bertrand, this asymmetric solution (i.e. IH = 1,IL =
0) is unfeasible for a large interval of the quality eﬀect because the low quality
has no incentive to introduce a product innovation. Rather, the equilibrium
asymmetric solution is the one where the high quality ﬁrm introduces a product
innovation, while the low quality ﬁrm adopts a process innovation. In this case no
27leapfrogging occurs, and the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation increases. Moreover,
a process innovation grants a robust cost advantage. For these reasons the quality
leader prefers a product innovation (the beneﬁt of a higher quality diﬀerential
is greater than reducing its production cost) while the quality follower chooses
a cost reduction innovation (it beneﬁts both of a reduction in the intensity of
competition due to the higher degree of vertical diﬀerentiation and of a cost
advantage).
Last, by comparing Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, we notice that the inter-
val where both ﬁrms adopt a process innovation, is greater under Bertrand than
under Cournot. Vice versa, the interval where both ﬁrms introduce a product
innovation is smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot (i.e. both ﬁrms select
I∗
i = 0 before in case of quantity competition than in case of price competition).
Hence, we add a new insight to the BH’s results: the Cournot competitors tend
to favor a product innovation in comparison with the Bertrand competitors, when
they both adopt an innovation (not only a single innovative ﬁrm as in BH). Fur-
thermore, the interval where ﬁrms behave asymmetrically is larger under Cournot
than under Bertrand: a less intense competition involves less need to imitate the
rival’s behavior.
To sum up, this contribution points out that ﬁrms selling goods with a quality
gap have diﬀerent incentives in adopting a product innovation, since introducing
the latter becomes a dominant strategy for the high (low) quality ﬁrm before
than for the quality follower (leader) under Bertrand (Cournot). It is crucial
to shed light some intuitions on this issue. BH, for instance, have provided
an answer based upon the competitive regime, but in a model where there is
only one innovator. We have instead obtained that, when both ﬁrms innovate,
the competitive regime may lead to diﬀerent outcomes because under Cournot
leapfrogging is possible, while it is unfeasible under Bertrand. The leapfrogging
eﬀect has been not considered by BH.
285 Conclusions
This paper investigates a duopoly model of vertical diﬀerentiation where ﬁrms
simultaneously select whether to adopt a process innovation or a product innova-
tion. This decision is taken both in case of Bertrand and Cournot competition.
The two innovations have diﬀerent impacts on ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, identiﬁed by
a costs saving eﬀect (process innovation) and by a market share premium (prod-
uct innovation). The analysis has produced the following results: First, under
both competitive regimes three equilibria in the innovation game may arise: two
symmetric (where both ﬁrms choose either a process or a product innovation)
and one asymmetric (where the two ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent innovation types). Sec-
ond, under Bertrand competition the asymmetric equilibrium leads to an increase
in the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation, since the high quality ﬁrm introduces a
product innovation and the low quality ﬁrm adopts a process innovation. On the
contrary, under Cournot competition leapfrogging occurs in case of asymmetric
information and this may also lead to a decrease in the degree of vertical diﬀeren-
tiation. The strategic positions of the two ﬁrms explain these diﬀerent behaviors
(in contrast with Bonanno and Haworth [1998] which consider only one innova-
tor): under Bertrand, leapfrogging never occurs because the low quality ﬁrm has
never the incentive to reduce the degree of vertical diﬀerentiation; under Cournot,
the low quality ﬁrm prefers to become the quality leader rather than selling to
the less rich market niche at a lower production cost. On the other hand, the
high quality ﬁrm does not suﬀer too much in case of leapfrogging since the quality
gap is small, and gets a robust beneﬁt from reducing its costs. Last, the interval
where both ﬁrms adopt a product innovation is larger under Cournot than un-
der Bertrand. Hence in a strategic context, the Cournot (Bertrand) competitors
display a tendency to favor product (process) innovation.
296 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Since yH ￿ 0 and yL ￿ 0 and in both FOCs’ the
denominator is positive, (15)–(16) are simultaneously satisﬁed when
4(4θ
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￿ 1011Ω3 − 4090Ω2 + 4632Ω − 1408










The ﬁrst two solutions are unfeasible (the ﬁrst one has θH ￿ θL which has been
ruled out by assumption); the third needs to investigate the root of the polynomial
128 − 584χ + 836χ2 − 461χ3 + 84χ4. Solving it w.r.t. χ yields two imaginary
roots and two real solutions: χ1 = 0.39872, χ2 = 2.71773. Then if Ω = χ2 we
have θH = 1.77763
c and θL = 2.71773
c , so that θH ￿ θL, which has been ruled out by




c . The latter is
the solution of the pre–innovation quality game.
2
Proof of Proposition 2: From (30)–(33) we get Table 1, where, by inspection, the
three equilibria emerge.
2
30ψ range IH(IL = 1) IH(IL = 0) IL(IH = 1) IL(IH = 0) Nash Eq.
1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.20 1 1 1 1 I∗
H = I∗
L = 1
1.20 < ψ ≤ 1.65 1 0 1 1 I∗
H = I∗
L = 1
1.65 < ψ ≤ 1.75 0 0 1 1 I∗
H = 0,I∗
L = 1
1.75 < ψ ≤ 2.33 0 0 1 0 I∗
H = I∗
L = 0
2.33 < ψ 0 0 0 0 I∗
H = I∗
L = 0
Table 1: Best replies and Nash equilibria under Bertrand
















8θH − 2θL + c(4θ
2
H − 23θHθL + 2θ
2
L) = 0











2993Υ2 − 995Υ + 72







Υ = Root of (−16 + 126ξ − 463ξ
2 + 749ξ
3)
As in the proof of Proposition 1 the ﬁrst two solutions are unfeasible while the
third needs to investigate the root of the above polynomial. The unique real






31Proof of Proposition 4: From (49)–(52), we get Table 2, and the indicated Nash
equilibria.
ψ range IH(IL = 1) IH(IL = 0) IL(IH = 1) IL(IH = 0) Nash Eq.
1 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.54 1 1 1 1 I∗
H = I∗
L = 1
1.54 < ψ ≤ 1.60 1 1 0 1 I∗
H = 1,I∗
L = 0
1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65 0 1 0 1 (I∗
H = 1,I∗
L = 0), (I∗
H = 0,I∗
L = 1)
1.65 < ψ ≤ 1.66 0 1 0 0 I∗
H = 1,I∗
L = 0
1.66 < ψ 0 0 0 0 I∗
H = I∗
L = 0
Table 2: Best replies and Nash equilibria under Cournot
If 1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65 two equilibria in pure strategies arises. We adopt a risk
dominance criterion to select the unique equilibrium ` a la Harsanyi–Selten [1988],
following Cabrales et al. [2000]. The strategic context when 1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65 is
summarized in the following matrix:
Firm L
Firm H IL = 0 IL = 1










Table 3: The subgame if 1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65
The risk dominance criterion compares the product of gains from correct pre-
dictions and the equilibrium with the largest product is the one that dominates.
We know from Table 2 that the game shown in Table 3 has two strict asym-
metric equilibria in pure strategies: IH = 0,IL = 1, that we label as H0L1 and
IH = 1,IL = 0 (denoted as H1L0). To compute the risk dominance equilibrium
we deﬁne GH0 as the gain made by ﬁrm H by predicting rightly that ﬁrm L will
play as in H0L1 (and best responding to the prediction) instead of predicting
wrongly that ﬁrm L will play as in H1L0 (and best responding to the prediction).
Hence GH0 = π01
H − π11
H . Similarly, let GH1 = π10
H − π00





L . The product of gains from correct predictions on the equilib-
rium H0L1 is then GH0 × GL0, while on the equilibrium H1L0 is GH1 × GL1.
Notice that:
GH0 =
1.61(ψ − 0.03)(ψ − 0.47)(ψ − 1.60)
c(8.72ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.34)
32GH1 = −
0.57(ψ − 0.09)(ψ − 1.66)(ψ2 − 0.16ψ + 0.12)
c(5.49ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.54)ψ
GL0 = −
0.50(ψ − 0.01)(ψ − 1.65)(ψ2 + 0.19ψ + 0.08)
cψ(8.72ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.34)
GL1 =
0.80(ψ − 0.04)(ψ − 0.66)(ψ − 1.54)
c(5.49ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.54)
so that
GH0×GL0 = −
0.80(ψ − 0.03)(ψ − 0.47)(ψ − 1.60)(ψ − 0.01)(ψ − 1.65)(ψ2 + 0.19ψ + 0.08)
c2(8.72ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.34)2ψ
(53)
GH1×GL1 = −
0.46(ψ − 0.09)(ψ − 1.66)(ψ2 − 0.16ψ + 0.12)(ψ − 0.04)(ψ − 0.66)(ψ − 1.54)
c2(5.49ψ2 − 3.46ψ + 0.54)2ψ
(54)
Solving expression (53) greater or equal to expression (54) for ψ we get it is
fulﬁlled for ψ ≥ 1.67 i.e. outside the relevant range (multiple equilibria arise
for 1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65). Hence the product of gains from correct predictions on
the equilibrium H1L0 are always greater than the product of gains from correct
predictions on the other equilibrium. This means that the equilibrium IH =
1,IL = 0 risk dominates the equilibrium IH = 0,IL = 1, and so it is the unique
equilibrium surviving the risk dominance reﬁnement when 1.60 < ψ ≤ 1.65.
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